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Introduction1
In this paper, I shall draw attention to background aspects of democracy and
démocratisation in two African countries, Zambia and Botswana, by exploring not
the topical developments at the national political scène (a task for which others
are much better qualified), but thé political culture at thé grassroots, to which my
prolonged participant observation as an anthropologist has given me access. Be-
fore we arrive at thé spécifie ethnography, I shall raise a number of methodologi-
cal and theoretical points without which, I feel, my argument would remain in thé
air. This takes us to a discussion of democracy, globalisation and thé dangers of
Eurocentrism, and leads us to distinguish three modes of defining democracy.
After having identified constitutional democracy as only one particular variant
among others, and as an item of political culture which has been relatively
recently introduced to Africa, we will discuss thé récent démocratie positions and
processes among thé people of Kaoma district, Zambia, and of the medium-sized
town of Francistown, Botswana. The purpose of the paper is, beyond a descriptive
one, to help define the wider setting and thé boundary conditions within which thé
more spécifie discussion of thé démocratisation process in Africa since the late
1980s can be situated; that discussion itself, however, to which our African
colleagues have made such major contributions, remains outside my présent
scope.2
Democracy, Globalisation and Possible Eurocentrism
Our social and political life is involved in an ever-accelerating process of globali-
sation.3 Through formai éducation and literacy, through electronic média which
hâve developed their own lingua franco of images which is more or less under-
stood wherever there is média réception, and through mass consumption which
spreads the silent language of standardised manufactured objects packed with
meanings across thé world, globalisation has produced a situation where a varying
percentage of thé inhabitants of all continents are familiär with and situationally
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adopt the global discourse, with its particular sélection of Symbols and meaning.
In thé process, thé discourses spécifie to their local, regional and national socio-
cultural environments are far from lost, but are situationally accommodated (with
varying degrees of intégration, conflict, subordination or dominance) to the global
discourse.
In the contemporary global discourse, 'democracy' has come to occupy an impor-
tant place. It often carries deep emotional significance. It has acquired great
mobilising power. In the course of the 20th Century, many thousands of people
have been prepared to die in struggles legitimated by référence to this symbol;
many more people have admired others making such sacrifices in the name of
democracy, and have spurred them on. Democracy has become a major export
item of the USA and NATO. Ideologically (without denying the economie, politi-
cal, religious and ethnie factors involved) the globalising concept of democracy
was the force that breached the Berlin Wall and exploded the communist empire
of Eastern Europe and North Asia. The global percolation of media images
docurnenting this process has also contributed to the current démocratisation
movement in many parts of Africa.
The social scientist or historian reflecting on this African movement faces dilem-
mas that, phrased only slightly differently, are only too familiär from the study of
world religions, mass consumption, styles of trade unionism, formai législation by
the nation-state, cosmopolitan medicine, and so many other aspects of the 20th
Century transformation of the African continent. These dilemmas address the
extent to which North Atlantic models can acquire global relevance, and force us
to explore the limitations of both Eurocentrism (which claims only one model to
be valid) and cultural relativism (which claims all possible models, including
those found outside the North Atlantic, to be equally valid and equally worth
preserving for the future).
(1) The dilemma of cultural imperialism: is the institution of democracy, which
we have seen spreading all over Africa, merely a submission to alien (viz. North
Atlantic) farms which therefore will only fit like the proverbial square peg in the
round hole of African cultures and societies; or is it, on the contrary, the awaken-
ing to a universal héritage of mankind, which has outgrown ïts being tied to a
spécifie culture of origin (West European, North American, or whatever), so that
Africans adopting it are merely coming into their own? In this light, the
post-colonial vicissitudes of democracy in Africa would not imply any qualita-
tive disability for democracy on the part of African societies and their members,
but would be equivalent to the (much longer) formative stage of the same institu-
tion in the North Atlantic région itself (see below).
(2) The dilemma of localisation: even if considered global or universal, institu-
tions invariably develop a local form; who is to say whether that local form is a
regrettable déviation from abstract global standards?
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(3) The dilemma of wrongly claimed universality: given the distribution of eco-
nomie and military power in the modern world (a basic state ofaffairs which the
paradigm of globalisation does not take sufficiently into account, rather tending
to obscure it under (îllusory) postulâtes of cultural convergence and equality),
could members of a relatively powerful nation-state resist the temptation of claim-
ing that their own culture-specific institutions have in fact supra-local, global
relevance and truth? African démocratisation gains interest and support outside
Africa since it appears to liberale local African populations from the poor consti-
tutional and economie performance of the post-colonial states in that continent.
But if this amounts to furthering the North Atlantic model of formal democracy
(disguised as universal), does it not at the same time imply the superiority of the
north, and reinforce the relations of subordination which have existed between
north and south since the 19th Century? Could démocratisation mean that local
African communities get rid of a failing state, but at the same time are more
effectively subjugated (ideologically, institutionally and, since local democratie
performance is increasingly a considération in intercontinental donor relations,
even economically) to unequal global power relations under northern hegemony?
Is that the hidden agenda of the démocratisation process?
(4) The social price of relativism: as social scientists we can afford to take our
distance from, for instance, the Christianity of our ancestors (a North Atlantic
institution whose spread outside Europe is well comparable to that of democracy),
but we make ourselves unpopulär and politically suspect in our own socio-politi-
cal environment if we try to adopt the same stance with regard to democracy.4
After all, who would not hope (especially in a secularising world of fragmented
meaning, when absurdity has become the stock in trade of 20th Century philoso-
phy, art and literature) that such democratie principles as human rights and gen-
era! élections, far from being culture-specific, would turn out to be universally
applicable, to be 'true'? With the contestation by students and workers in Western
Europe and North America in the late 1960s, the semantics of 'democracy' has
moreover developed so as to include not only the constitutional level of the
nation-state, but also participation, responsibility, initiative and compétence in
one's immédiate micro-political environment (for example, on thé shop-floor,
social organisation or urban residential area). Democracy has become an impor-
tant standard of évaluation for thé legitimate managing of all power relations in
which we are involved, and by implication for thé propriety and meaning of all
social action. The production of knowledge about democracy therefore is much
more subject to social control (and thus far more prône to Eurocentrism) than
many other respectable fields of cross-cultural social enquiry, for instance, con-
cerning weaning practices, conflict settlement in polygamous households, or
manuring techniques in peasant agriculture.
As an anthropological field-worker I hâve participated for long periods, and with
as much existential commitment as I could summon, in four African societies51
was not born in, and there I hâve often encountered — and hâve lived — principles
*
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and procedures for the exercise of social power very different from the demo-
cratie ideas of my home society (Dutch urban society); in the latter, however, I
consider myself a democrat. Against this background I cannot offer easy solutions
for the dilemmas listed here. Meanwhile it is my contention that the current
discussion on démocratisation in Africa sometimes runs the risk of becoming
myopie and Eurocentric in not paying sufficient attention to the analytical and
methodological implications of cultural imperialism, localisation, wrongly
claimed universality, and the social priée of relativism — all of which are not
exactly conducive to our objectivity as analysts.
Three Modes of Definmg Democracy
We also need to sharpen our conceptual tools and bring them into historical
perspective. Democracy is a number of things at the same time, so that the term
démocratisation, as the process of bringing about or enhancing democracy, may
refer to distinct and quite different phenomena. I propose to distinguish three
modes, designated A, B and C.
Philosophically, 'democracy' dénotes a spécifie ans wer to the question as to the
source, within a collectivity of human beings, of the legitimate exercise of power
through légal and political institutions. In the case of democracy, that source is not
a supernatural being, a king, an aristocracy, a spécifie gender or âge group, a
priestly caste, a revealed unchangeable text or shrine, but 'the people' (A). State-
ments about 'the people' are sufficiently flexible and gratuitous to allow the
philosophical label of democracy to be applied in numerous settings where in fact,
through complex symbolic, ideological, legal and military means, voluntary or
forced représentation and usurpation have dramatically narrowed down the range
of those who actually exercise the power. Examples would include not only the
recently dismantled oligarchy of the German Democratie Republic, but also clas-
sical Athens — where women, and (for both sexes) slaves, children and youths,
resident migrants (metoikoi), and citizens banished abroad, could not participate
in the 'democratie' process.6 After a succession of impérial, monarchical and
théocratie options in the course of two millennia, democracy once more became
the dominant legal-philosophical concept in the European tradition, and was
pruned of its biases of inequality, in the American Déclaration of Independence
and subsequently the French Revolution, in the 18th Century; the lists of basic
human rights formulated in that context, still constitute the basis for the legal
philosophy of democracy today.7
What marked these developments since the Enlightenment was the translation of
the legal philosophy of democracy into constitutional and organisational arrange-
ments that stipulate, in controllable and enforceable detail, the spécifie practical
steps through which the idéal source of power is translated into concrete actions,
offices, and personnel. It is these constitutional arrangements, rather than their
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philosophical élaboration, which have since characterised modern democracy
(B).
Direct democracy through a plenary meeting (for which a pro diem was paid)
with secret ballot was the ancient Greek formula at one stage, and archaeologists
have pondered over the potsherds and the curious many-slotted stone slabs (an-
ticipating our ballot computers of today) used in the process. Plenary meetings
with formal voting procedures (or oath-taking, or other communication methods
aimed at consensus) were found in many other historie societies, around the
| Mediterranean and beyond, organised on the basis of relatively small-scale local
1 communities. For instance, the democratie thrust of the Dutch struggle for inde-
pendence from Spain in the 16th Century derived inspiration not only from philo-
sophical, or rather theological, reflection on the ultimate source of legitimate
( power by early Protestant thinkers, but also from a much older tradition of village
communities collectively administering their irrigation works (polders and dikes).
It is important to appreciate the factor of scale. Village communities conducive to
direct political participation at the local level still exist all over the world. More-
; over, a broadly comparable level of face-to-face interaction and ensuing direct
t interests on a day-to-day basis is, paradoxically, found among many members of
, urban mass society, in so far as these spend much of their working and leisure
* time in relatively small operational groups as defined within formal organisations
! A and institutions (schools, churches, factories, government departments, sport
r s clubs, etc.). Hère the issues tend to be concrete and immediately appealing, and
^ the often informai structures for individual participation in the decision-making
t1 % process may have far greater relevance in the people's consciousness, than the
|s| formal and infrequently used constitutional arrangements for democracy at the
ƒ* national level.
Contemporary mass society as organised in nation-states at the national level no
: longer allows for direct democracy (although the current state of technology
would make this a dated position, now that téléphone lines and other electronic
information carriers capable of instantaneous two-way communication extend
into the majority of residential areas and even households). The standard formula
has, of course, become that of représentative délégation of 'the power of the
people' through individual secret ballot by each eligible citizen registered as a
voter. This is so much the accepted pattern that the organisation and international
inspection of général élections has become the test par excellence of democracy.
In discussions of démocratisation in Africa, democracy is often equated with the
; ;• présence of these very spécifie formal requirements.
The lexical and philosophical roots of the concept of democracy are far older than
,. .' the spécifie accepted constitutional practical arrangements of democracy. In cur-
•, *-' • ̂ , rent discussions about démocratisation in Africa we often forget that the constitu-
, ; ' tional form of democracy as représentative government empowered through
't f:''''^'^- général élections is only a recent phenomenon in the north, and had far from
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materialised in its present form by the time of the Scramble for Africa which
starled the colonial period. For most West European countries which effectively
colonised most of Africa asfrom the late 19th Century, the colonial period in part
coincided, domestically, with a prolongea struggle for democratie rights on the
o
part of the middle classes, workers, women, andyouths.
The constitutional rights (summed up by the maxim 'one man (person) one vote')
which Africans came to demand for themselves in the 1950s, thus belong to a
package of modernity which, also in Western Europe, is 20th Century rather than
19th, let alone earlier.
Meanwhile, the formal constitutional model of democracy has certain built-in
features which would be self-defeating, unless other, less formal additional ar-
rangements corne to its rescue. For instance, the distance between the voter and
the resulting national government under this model is so large, and the intervening
stages and procedures are so complex, mat the constitutional procedures of formal
democracy may in themselves scarcely fester, in the ordinary voters, a sense of
political compétence, of actively shaping the present and future of their lives by
participating in the décisions that most affect them; or, if they would still have
such a sense of participation, it would often be based on illusion.
The negative effects of this distance can, however, be reduced in a number of
ways, including:
• active participation in political parties organised on a mass basis;
• the development of a political culture of information and accountability, where
citizens are aware of their constitutional rights and duties and where formai
constitutional rights and politicians' performance are effectively tested by in-
dependent courts;
• thé development, both in a formai bureaucratie form and through networks of
lobbying, canvassing and opinion-making, of transparent links between thé
realms of direct participation at the grassroots level (not necessarily in political
parties, but also in schools, churches, development committees, tenants' com-
mittees, co-operatives, union branches etc.) and thé national political centre.
People do not necessarily apply thé same norms and procédures to (a) their
immédiate day-to-day environment and (b) more distant national issues, and
whereas a rigid divorce between thé local and thé national (in terms of political
participation and identification) would amount to withdrawal, disenchantment,
estrangernent, of individuals vis-à-vis thé political centre, a properly démo-
cratie System would succeed in effectively linking thé local and thé national.
• direct personal accessibility of those in power through networks of patronage,
nepotism, regionalism, ethnicity and co-religionism; this is not exactly an
option stipulated by thé global democratie model, but it happens to be thé only
one that is found all over Africa;
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• the existence of an open and genera! political discussion in the wider society,
furthered by the overall accessibility of the written and electronic media, free-
dom of the press, widespread literacy, and a level of affluence enabling people
access to the media.
All mis amounts to a comprehensive political culture of democracy, which cannot
be reduced to an abstract légal formula 'the source of all legitimate power is the
people' (A), nor to the spécifie constitutional procedures including général élec-
tions (B). lts essence would appear to be that people actively and responsibly
participate, and have the sense ofparticipating, in the major décisions that affect
their present and future, in such a way that they see their major values and
premises respected and reinforced, in a political process that links the local and
the national (C).
To sum up, we have identified a philosophical (A), a constitutional (B) and a
sociological (C) définition of democracy. All three agrée that democracy is
'something of the people'. As an anthropologist I flatter myself that I have learned
something of the ordinary life and the private world-view of 'the people' who
were my research participants. However, working through participant observation
in local settings of face-to-face relations I have only obtained glimpses of the
national level to the extent to which that national level happens effectively to
interpenetrate and link up with the local level. Since the 1970s anthropologists
have struggled, and not vainly, to incorporate the state and the global political
economy into their discourse. Therefore, if from the local level, the national
political centre becomes visible only in a fragmented and problematic way, I
submit that this is because the local/national relations are in fact problematic in
the local situations under study, and not because anthropology has difficulty in
addressing such situations. All the same, while local/national relations will be
highlighted in my discussion of démocratisation among peasants (generally iden-
tifying under the ethnie label of 'Nkoya') from Kaoma district in Zambia's
Western Province (formerly Barotseland), and among working-class townsmen
(most of whom identify ethnically as 'Kalanga' or as belonging to any of the
various Tswana groups, mainly 'Ngwato', 'Kwena', 'Ngwaketse', 'Kgatla') from
Francistown, Botswana,9 my actual research was conceived in such a way that it
does not enable me to make valid genera! pronouncements concerning dé-
mocratisation in these countries at the national level.
But before we turn to the ethnographie detail there is one more genera! hurdle to
take. If constitutional democracy (B) has Sprung from the dynamics of the North
Atlantic societies, how must we visualise its reception in African societies? The
current wave of démocratisation in Africa since the late 1980s appeals to, and
seeks to restore, constitutional rights and procedures which allegedly have gone
dormant under the failing performance of the post-colonial nation-states. But
when and how were they planted on African soil in the first place?
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Constitutional Democracy (B) as a Recently Introduced Item of
Political Culture in Africa
At independence, African post-colonial states emerged as thé continuation of the
bureaucratie apparatus of thé colonial state, but now increasingly staffed with
African personnel, and defined by a national constitution. The constitution was, in
most cases, and initially at least, highly reminiscent of that of the former colonial
métropole. The exercise of state power by this bureaucratie apparatus was legiti-
mated by constitutionally well-defined patterns of populär participation through
thé général franchise. In the background, the constitutional process would be
supported by international and intercontinental treaties ensuring thé post-inde-
pendent nation-state of a respected place among thé world's nations upholding
fundamental human rights. Usually thèse rights were specifically summed up
in thé constitution.
The spécifie constitutional pattern thus stipulated in thé new nation-states of
Africa in thé 1960s could boast only a shallow time-depth on African soil. The
rôles, statuses, rights and organisational forms, thé concrète procédures of candi-
dacy, individual vote, loyal opposition etc., as defined by that pattern, were alien
to thé indigenous structures of legitimate political power which had prevailed in
most parts of Africa through most of thé 19th and early 20th Century. In other
words, thé pattern was not in continuity with modes of participation and légitima-
tion which Africans from a village background would spontaneously apply in
their immédiate face-to-face social environment. If constitutional democratie fea-
tures were already part of the political culture of the colonial métropole, the
colonial state was built on the principle that they should not be extended to the
vast majority of African 'subjects'.
How did this essentially alien and imported political culture take root in the
minds, actions and institutions of 20th Century Africans?
Conversion to world religions, especially Christianity, the concomitant access to
literacy and formai éducation, and the adoption of positions as workers, foremen
and clerks within capitalist relations of colonial production, made Africans share
in aspects of the same societal expérience (typically embedded within formal
organisations such as schools, churches, mines, manufacturing enterprises, thé
police, thé army, local government) that had prompted the démocratie process in
thé North Atlantic région up to about half a Century earlier.
The African expérience was not just one of humiliation, although there certainly
was an infuriating amount of that. Participating in a missionary organisation as an
African evangelist, in a local government structure as a borna (district administra-
tion) messenger, in a school as a junior teacher, in a mine as a driller or 'boss-
boy', also involved (precisely while being humiliated) learning about thé exercise
and manipulation of power in a context of formal organisations; learning about an
impersonal legal authoriry that derived not from God or from personal charisma
through birth or achievement (e.g. kingship), but from the abstract written word of
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law and régulation; learning about rigid and intricate patterns of the organisation
of time and space which had come in the trappings of colonialism and peripheral
capitalism but which even more fundamentally defined the 20th Century societal
expérience both in the north and in the south. In the latter part of the world they
were manifested in the layout of the residential space — segregated in terms of
'race' and status — and the rhythm of time between work and off-duty, Christian
Sunday and secular weekday, not to mention the legally-defined periods of time
involved in the payment of poll tax, of notice when fired, and the contractual
spells of migrant labour. All this against the background of a hidden premise of
West European modernity (which settlers and other colonialists struggled in vain
to prevent from seeping through to the colonised subjects): the human individual
as essentially equal to other individuals, i.e. as interchangeable in a marnier
similar to manufactured products (and workers) in the Industrial Révolution; but
also, more positively, in the sense that each human individual could be taken as
exemplary in the manner of biological species, chemical éléments and physical
laws which post-Renaissance natural science had come to define; essentially
equal, despite différences in status and power (related to class and race), and as
equals converging theologically in the original sin and the Christian salvation of
mankind according to the missionaries' preachings; and, in a secularising society
increasingly organised along bureaucratie lines, equal before the letter of imper-
sonal legal authority. Under the circumstances it could only be a matter of time
until such prernises of equality were also applied in the constitutional sphère, in
the sense of universal franchise for Africans restored to compétence and initiative
over the political and social institutions that governed their lives.
In the struggle for de-colonisation and independence a crucial rôle was played by
varieties of self-organisation (trade unions, political parties, welfare societies,
burial societies, rotating credit associations, ethnie and dancing groups, women's
movements, and such churches as welcomed populär participation and initiative)
which were soon to be patterned after the same model of formai organisation.
Until quite late in the colonial period, however, only a minority of the African
population was sufficiently deeply involved in imported organisational structures
to internalise the attitudes and values that would make them articulate democrats
in the global, constitutional sense.
The African independence movement of the 1950s was not only about a vocal and
educated African elite wrenching constitutional power from the hands of the
colonialists, but also about a brood social transformation which, through commu-
nication, mobilisation and mass organisation, made the tenets of constitutional
democracy come to lifefor large numbers of Africans irrespective of their mode of
livelihood, urban or rural résidence, level of éducation or religions creed. The
leaders of the struggle for independence were political brokers canvassing for
position, and planning a new nation-state. They were also the prophets, at least
temporarily honoured in their own lands, of a brand-new democratie political
culture.
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They were not the only ones to offer a blueprint of a meaningful and attainable
future to African populations which had seen their cosmologically structured,
coherent universe fall apart in the turmoil of the 19th and early 20th Century. As
pedlars of meaning, organisational structure and restored compétence through
effective action, the independence politicians with their secular and constitutional
message were in stark, often violent compétition, over their following among the
African masses, with witch-finders, prophets, church leaders, who locally or at a
grander scale offered their own interprétations of current misery and future re-
dress.10 In many of these attempts at symbolic or ritual salvation, there was a large
amount of bricolage, the various distinct movements arriving at spécifie re-com-
binations of éléments derived from the traditional world-view as well as from
Christianity. The democratie movement around independence mainly sought to
explore the mobilising potential of the common men's expériences of peripheral
capitalism and colonialism in the propagation of a democratie and constitutional
political culture which — certainly in the 1950s — was West European f ar more
than it had already become localised and African. B y contrast, the religiously-ori-
entated alternatives to the democratie movement showed far greater continuity
vis-à-vis the ideological and organisational orientation that had largely informed
African life in the 19th Century, and that was still a formidable force in the rural
areas and in the kin networks of migrant workers in town. From one point of view
there was, between the various political and ideological options at the time, a
struggle for or against continuity of the village-based traditional world-view; from
another, complementary viewpoint, various contesting catégories within the
changing local society manipulated alternative world-views so as to re-define the
political and economie interrelations between these social catégories. Chiefs,
headmen, and elders in genera! derived much of their power over young men and
over women from a traditional world-view that made these elderly men the main
intermediaries between the villagers and cosmological forces (ancestors, spirits of
the wild, the High God, royal spirits), and as such the indispensable mediators in
the relations (sexual, conjugal, judicial) even between young men and women.
For young men, particularly, this world-view hardly answered the existential
questions related to their expérience as migrant workers, and it denied such
independence from elders as they had aspired to, and often actually enjoyed, at
their distant places of work; the youth's adoption of ne w secular political or
Christian idéologies helped them to take a relative view of the elders which had so
far dominated their lives.1 '
Thus the continuity of a cosmologically-anchored local world-view with its own
conceptions of legitimate political power and procedure; the interaction between
on the one hand traditional leaders and, on the other, those of their subjects
pursuing modern careers outside the village settings; the prominence of religious
alternatives for the symbolic restructuring of local society; the explicit formula-
tion, and the transmutation, of democratie political values in the mobilisation
process of an independence struggle; and the spécifie relations to develop be-
tween local and national level at, and since, independence. All these would seem
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to be important factors in thé production of a démocratie political culture in thé
global sensé. With this in mind, let us now turn to our two ethnographie examples.






















Democracy Versus Ethnicity in Kaoma District, Zambia
The dynamics of democracy and démocratisation in Kaoma district, Zambia, must
be understood against the background of its traditional and neo-traditional politi-
cal structure and its colonial expérience.
The fertile, well-watered lands of Nkoya (now largely coinciding with thé Kaoma
district, on thé Zambezi/Kafue watershed, at roughly the same latitude as Zam-
bia's capital Lusaka but 400 km west) was the scène of dispersed communities of
hunters, fishermen and agriculturalists organised on a basis of localised clans,
when, from the middle of the 18th Century, a number of kingdoms emerged here
under the influence of long-distance trading opportunities and of political ideas
derived from the Lunda empire in southern Zaïre. Around 1850 most of these
kingdoms became incorporated in the Kololo/Luyana state which has since been
known as Barotseland, with the Barotse or Lozi as the dominant ethnie group.
Barotseland became the Protectorate of Northwestern Rhodesia in 1900, and even
after Zambia's independence maintained a special status within the new republic
until 1969 (Caplan 1969). Under the Lozi king, whose official title is Litunga,
{U'./
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only two Nkoya royal titles (Mwene Kahare and Mwene Mutondd) managed to
survive through thé colonial period, as recognised and subsidised senior members
of thé Lozi aristocracy.12 Nkoya traditional politics, concentrated on the Kahare
and Mutondo capitals, has displayed a highly articulate cérémonial culture, in-
volving, in addition to thé royal family, a Prime Minister (Mwanashihemï), other
titled court officiais including judges, and court priests, musicians, executioners
and slaves (thé latter two statuses have been re-defined in récent times). Along
with thé senior court officials, about a dozen senior village headmen constituted
thé Mwene's royal council, where13 cases involving protocol and royal matters
were handled, land was issued to locals and strangers who so requested, and thé
Mwene's diplomatie relations with other Myene, with the Litunga, and the colo-
nial, subsequently post-colonial government were deliberated. In exceptionally
important situations (e.g. death of a Mwene or élection of a successor, thé visit of
a major outside officiai, or cases involving witchcraft accusations of royals or
otherwise reflecting on thé entire kingdom) thé council's session would be held
not in the Mwene's audience hall but outside, and then all subjects of the Mwene
(regardless of gender and âge) had a right to attend, whereas mature men (well
over 40 years of âge) and — but rarely — women of thé same âge group would
take the floor, displaying their skills at the formai Nkoya rhetoric. A strong sensé
of protocol and procédure permeates Nkoya traditional politics and constitutional
law. The Mwanashihemi is usually co-opted (by thé Mwene and thé royal council)
from another kingdom so as to ensure impartial application of thèse rules.
Political office is within thé reach of many, and coveted. The bilatéral kinship
System with endogamous tendencies makes Unes of descent frequently merge, so
that kin groups are defined by ad hoc micropolitical dynamics hingeing on co-
residence. It is these kin groups of shifting composition which own titles of
kingship and village headmanship — the proper names or praise-names of their
ancestors — and whose senior mâle members, after secret délibérations, confer a
vacant title upon a candidate of their choice by a ritual of name inheritance called
ushwana. An honoured title as headman is therefore within thé reach of many
men who live to attain middle âge, and even the pool out of which royal candi-
dates could be selected used to be quite large until, under Lozi and colonial
influence, patrilineal descent was imposed; but even so there are still a number of
rival royal candidates at every succession. And far from being considered obso-
lète, thé compétition for offices as headman, senior headman and Mwene is still
very lively and sometimes (in a society where poison and sorcery are common-
place) even deadly — thèse offices have continued to represent the highest form
of career achievement, not only for those who have spent most of their lives in thé
village but also for labour migrants who have returned to the rural areas after
living in town for décades and attaining stable and even senior positions there.
14The Mwene ultimately dérives descent from thé démiurge Mvula, i.e. Rain, and
while Mvula's relationship vis-à-vis the High God Nyambi is not totally clear, thé
kingship is explicitly legitimated by référence to Nyambi's status as thé first
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Mwene and as Mwene of the Sky. In terms of symbolic légitimation Nkoya
kingship présents a Janus face: on the one hand the Mwene represents celestial
beings and as such he is the incarnation of the cosmic order on earth; on the other
hand his office is surrounded with connotations of sorcery and physical violence
which are absolutely abhorred in the context of Nkoya non-royal village life. This
présents an interesting puzzle for historical, symbolic and theoretical analysis, but
we cannot present the details of ils solution hère (Van Binsbergen 1992a, 1993e).
Suffice to say that there is a notion of legitimate power (ngovu), which is cos-
mologically anchored and of which the Mwene by virtue of a very elaborate
enthronement ceremony15 is the central représentative, but only in so far as his
actions remain within the dignity (shishemu) of his office and are underpinned by
the advice from the royal council, which tends to be quite vocal. Mwene mwene
na bantu'. 'a Mwene is Mwene by virtue of the people', is the Nkoya maxim. In
addition to his title and regalia, followers are the Mwene's most important asset,
and hè is in practice dependent upon public opinion for his continuation in office.
Just like the village headman, the king is dependent upon his followers' continued
support, in the form of loyalty, respect and résidence within his realm; formerly
also in the form of tribute and tribute labour — a Mwene cannot engage in
productive labour and would starve to death without tribute — as happened to the
impeached Mwene Kashina in the mid-19th Century. Since people have latent
rights of membership and résidence including use of land and other natural
resources in a number of villages beside the village of their actual résidence, a
failing village headman sees the ranks of his followers dwindle by their moving to
different villages until the village may be completely depleted; a failing royal
Mwene may even be killed by the senior councillors. Régicide, forced abdication
and impeachment of Myene are documented in the région's history throughout
the 19th and 20th Century. For fear of being poisoned therefore, no Mwene would
drink beer that is not tasted first by a trusted kinswoman or cupbearer.
The Nkoya political System as it has existed since the 18th Century (incorporating
many éléments from a clan-based pre-kingship system that is considerably
older)16 thus reflects interestingly on the three définitions of democracy presented
above. There is a notion that high political office, however exalted a status and
surrounded by taboos separating the Mwene from his subjects, and however
underpinned by cosmological références, could not afford to dissociate itself from
the people (A). There was a pattern of effective participation within the kingdom,
in principle open to all subjects but in practice usually delegated to senior head-
men and to mature men in genera! (C). But the constitutional procedures stipulat-
ing the élection to high office and the exercise of power were completely different
from those of the global democratie model (B), and defined for mature men a
secluded realm of constitutional compétence in a way which (through the exclu-
sion of youth and women) reinforced gender and age cleavages in the local
society.
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Perhaps one would expect that such a historie political System offered fertile
ground for thé adoption of thé global democratie model, also in terms of constitu-
tional procedures. The opposite, however, turaed out to be thé case, as is clear
from developments in mis région in thé 1950s and early 1960s, when Zambia was
involved in thé struggle for independence.
For most Nkoya at the time, colonial rule was not much of an issue. Incorporation
in thé global capitalist economy through labour migration had started early (late
19th Century), but until well after independence it took thé form of circulatory
labour migration which kept people's social and conceptual dependence on their
rural society of origin largely intact. The Nkoya (certainly those of the eastern
Mashasha kingdom, that of Mwene Kahare) hardly had an option, since until ça.
1950 they had very little access to missionary éducation and therefore no basic
skills that might hâve launched them on a stable urban career. The same lack of
éducation, particularly illiteracy, made it difficult for thé global democratie model
to be absorbed by them at an early âge. The imposition of colonial rule had
reinforced thé hold of thé Lozi indigenous administration in thé région, and it was
i the Lozi, far more than thé British, who were perceived as oppressors. The
seething of protest and contestation throughout thé Fédération of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland in thé second half of thé colonial period, in thé Nkoya région, at first
took thé form of symbolic reconstruction of society through witchcraft eradication
(which often had anti-Lozi overtones, and was supported by thé Myene), followed
in thé 1950s by an outbreak of blatant sorcery practices (Reynolds 1964) as if ne w
forms of power, meaning and redress could only be found in thé mystical sphère
and not in secular constitutional change. Only when démocratie independence
pioneers in thé centre of Barotseland (thé Wina brothers, Princes Nakatindi)
turned out to challenge thé Lozi aristocratie establishment, did thé Nkoya become
? interested in modem politics, but thé Litunga managed to prevent the registration
(Mulford 1967) of a Nkoya branch of Mr H. Nkumbula's ANC — thé Zambian
< independence party from which Mr K. Kaunda's ZANC (soon to be called UNIP)
broke away in 1958. A few Nkoya young men who meanwhile, against many
odds, had managed to get some formai éducation and had embarked on urban
careers, featured in thé various political parties on thé Northern Rhodesian scène
around 1960. Some even started an ethnically-orientated but, abortive, party
called Mankoya Fighting Fund, and in thé first général élections thé Nkoya
massively supported UNIP, but still the issue as perceived by thé Nkoya was
anti-Lozi far more than in favour of independence and constitutional democracy.
When at independence thé Lozi turned out to have occupied powerful positions in
régional and national government, while not a single Nkoya operated at thèse
levels, and when moreover thé UNIP government stopped labour migration to
Zimbabwe and South Africa which had been the Nkoya's main source of cash for
many decades, the interest in modem politics dissipated entirely, and the Nkoya
withdrew within thé confines of the neo-traditional local politics.
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During my first fieldwork in thé région in thé early 1970s, it was shocking to see
how little thé local population considered themselves to be part of post-inde-
pendent Zambia. Zambia was the name for a country 'out there', along the 'Line
of Rail' that crosses Zambia from north to south and along which its towns were
concentrated. The principles and procedures of Zambia's constitutional organisa-
tion seemed largely unknown among most villagers, and commanded even less
loyalty. Democratie voting procedures were considered morally and cosmologi-
cally obscene, for implying that political office could be bought for promises,
favours and money rather than being a high responsibility entrusted to the best
candidate on the basis of the elders' secret délibérations, and the legitimating ;
ushwana installation ceremony which guaranteed ancestral support for the new
incumbent. Incorporation in the wider world had so far only produced a concep-
tual boundary vis-à-vis that world, not a sense of wider relationships and responsi-
bilities, let alone a new sense of power and compétence at the national level. Even
the Kaoma district centre, with its administrative and judicial offices and UNIP
headquarters, was an alien place, where no Nkoya occupied any position in the
political and administrative hierarchy above messenger, driver or cleaner; Nkoya
were also conspicuously absent among local entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, the
most conspicuous local link with the UNIP government was in the person of
Mwene Kahare, whose subtle manoeuvring in the struggle for independence had
gained him the honour of being nominated a party trustee. Besides, hè was made a
member of the national House of Chiefs, and although this did not give him any
tangible power at the national level, it gave his subjects in the rural areas the
illusory satisfaction that when their Mwene was summoned to Lusaka hè went
there, using government transport, in order to rule Zambia! Lozi oppression was
feit to continue as before independence, and there was widespread nostalgia for
the blessings of the colonial period, when blankets and clothing had been cheap
and migrants' cash earnings had not been subject to income tax at source.
In the early 1970s, a local branch of UNIP existed nominally but it was virtually *\
invisible at the village level. Rather more visible was a UNIP Youth branch,
largely composed of sons and clients of senior headmen who were the Mwene's
main rivais with regard to traditional office. With very little feedback from na- «!
tional and regional headquarters, the youths' activities did not consist of political *
instruction or mobilisation. At the time when UNIP Youths elsewhere in Zambia
created havoc with their violent card-selling and card-checking practices, the ^
Nkoya Youth made themselves occasionally useful as a work-force for communal j
projects (emulating a historie pattern of tribute labour). They were particularly
conspicuous when they organised a mass trial where Mwene Kahare and his staff -
were accused of the kind of ritual murder that had always been part and parcel of |
the kingship. In the process the youths presented a list of demands that, if impie- „)
mented, would have made them the de facto authorities in the kingdom. This ^
challenge of the traditional establishment misfired (ultimately the Mwene, subsi-
dised and officially gazetted, had much more backing from the outside world than ^
the self-styled UNIP Youths), but what is particularly revealing is that the youths' $
'k
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attack was completely inward-looking and failed to adopt thé idiom of the national
democratie model. The Mwene, on his part, could not convert his basic loyalty to thé
UNIP government and thé post-colonial state into political éducation for his
subjects, since his relationship with his subjects was determined by constitutional
principles which were totally alien to thé global democratie model.
The Nkoya participated in thé struggle for independence on the basis of their own
ethnie priorities, and did not yet learn much about constitutional democracy in thé
process. Thus thé first opportunity, around independence, of turning the Nkoya
into participants in thé national démocratie process, was almost completely lost.
But not quite. I have passed over the urban expérience of Nkoya migrants at the
time. In thé second half of the 1960s, Zambian towns were in thé throes of
conflict between ANC and UNIP, which was only resolved by thé création of the
second Republic, under UNIP, in December 1971.17 Nkoya urban résidents had
participated in this process as inhabitants of urban residential areas siding with
one particular party, as street fighters etc., but only a handful of them had actually
taken up office in either political organisation and thus had been exposed to the
inner organisational structure and procedures of the democratie process. One of
them, Mr J. Kalaluka, had even stood as an ANC parliamentary candidate in the
1968 élections, but had lost. The forced amalgamation between ANC and UNIP
enabled him to be a UNIP candidate in the 1973 élections, and then hè became the
MP for Kaoma East. When, within a few years, hè managed to add a ministerial
post to his seat in parliament, the Nkoya had finally found the link to the centre that
was to teach them how to appreciate and make use of modern constitutional forms.
Three additional factors facilitated this process: the Lozi's décline at the national
level, successful rural development in Kaoma district, and the Nkoya's ethnie
self-organisation.
(a) In 1969 President Kaunda had terminated the special status of the former
Barotseland within the Republic of Zambia, and the 1970s saw the décline of Lozi
power at the national level. In the process, the president and his administration
missed few opportunities to curry favour with the Nkoya.
(b) In 1971, moreover, the powerful parastatal Tobacco Board of Zambia had
initiated a major development scheme in the eastern part of Kaoma district. Few
local villagers could lastingly benefit, as tenants, from the new opportunities this
scheme offered, and the farms were largely occupied by ethnie strangers. Yet
within 15 years the very sparsely populated forest turned into a rural town of
nearly 20,000 inhabitants, Nkeyema, with schools, clinics, a thriving UNIP party
branch, etc. (Nelson-Richards 1988). For a number of political brokers of Nkoya
background, including Mr Kalaluka, the scheme offered both personal economie
advancement and a platform for active mobilisation along ethnie and regional
unes. Hère, for thé first time, UNIP songs and the Zambian national anthem were
sung in thé Nkoya language, whose legitimate existence had so far been denied by
thé Lozi and thé central state. Nkoya gradually awoke to the idea that the modem
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state and its institutions were not necessarily inimical, either to thé ethnie identity
they had developed in the context of Lozi incorporation, or to thé kingship that
had become thé central expression of that identity. While Zambia as a whole saw
a period of steady économie décline in thé second half of the 1970s and through-
out thé 1980s, thé relative économie situation in what had used to be a stagnant
labour reserve, Kaoma district, began to look less bleak. Realising that thé state
had little to offer, economically, beyond the mixed blessings of the Nkeyema
Scheme, Nkoya/state contacts increasingly concentrated on a non-material deal:
the exchange of the Nkoya citizen's loyal support and participation, for state
récognition and consolidation of their ethnie identity and traditional leadership.
(c) This process was formalised when in thé early 1980s, after diffuse prépara-
tions from thé mid-1970s, a few middle-class urbanités from a Nkoya background
founded thé Kazanga Cultural Association. This society has since linked urban
and rural sections of Nkoya life, particularly through thé organisation, since 1988,
of thé annual Kazanga cultural festival, where thé Zambian state has always put in
an appearance through a délégation at ministerial level. The festival (one of the
five of its nature in the country, to be announced and reported on Zambia télévi-
sion) is an enormous source of pride to thé Nkoya, and générâtes ail sorts of
further activities and innovations in thé cultural, organisational and économie
fields.
As a resuit of these developments over the past 20 years, the Nkoya people of
Kaoma district hâve become far more effectively incorporated in thé post-colonial
state. The misery, bitterness, indignation and estrangement from thé state under
thé Kaunda administration, which marked thé 1980s for particularly thé urban
populations of Zambia, were hère attenuated, somewhat by thé rural économie
opportunities, but to a much larger extent by thé ethnie revival the people went
through, which restored a sensé of meaning and compétence to their rieh cultural
life, and created contexts in which this héritage was no longer self-consciously
cherished and fossilised within a local universe increasingly sealed off from an
inimical outside world, but could be communicated to that outside world, in forms
(particularly média coverage) which hâve gréât prestige in that outside world, and
which generale further innovation.
Interesting innovations are now taking place in thé kingship. In thé early 1970s
thé Nkoya neo-traditional court culture was marked by a rigid splendour. The
emphatic maintenance of nostalgie historie forms of protocol and symbolic, par-
ticularly musical, production (which no longer corresponded with any real power
invested in the kingship under conditions of incorporation by the Lozi indigenous
state and by thé colonial and post-colonial central state) reflected the fact that the
need for boundary maintenance vis-à-vis thé outside world was at its peak. Ail
this contrasts strikingly with thé laxity of court life today. It is as if the focus of
articulation of Nkoya cérémonial court culture has now shifted from thé day-to-
day protocol at the secluded traditional capitals controlled by traditional council-
lors, to thé annual public performance at the Kazanga festival, before central-state
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dignitaries and a massive audience of spectators, and controlled by the Kazanga
association executive. Of course, the kingship, based on a local vision of the
political and cosmological order, could only lose out when the subjects came to
participate more effectively and whole-heartedly in a national democratie order
based on very different constitutional principles. However, at the same time a
fervent reconstruction process is going on, where the Kazanga Cultural Associa-
tion effectively negotiates between the state, the kings and the villagers, insisting
on a new symbolic and cérémonial rôle for all four18 Nkoya kings together along
lines which, while ostentatiously appealing to tradition, in fact constitute recent
innovations, rather at variance with established historical patterns, but which do
result in restoring the kings to a level of emotional and symbolic significance
perhaps unprecedented in 20th Century Nkoya history. During the 1992 Kazanga
festival, Mwene Kahare Kabambi, who used to be a somewhat pathetic, stammer-
ing figure dressed in a faded suit with ragged shirt collar, appeared covered in
léopard skins and with a headband adorned with régal zimpande (Conus Shells),
and formidably brandishing his royal axe and broadsword, and after drinking
from the sacred pit with beer made of the year's first harvest, for the first time in
living memory performed the kutomboke royal solo dance which kept the audi-
ence breathless and moved them to tears. After his death in 1993, his successor
Mwene Kahare Kubama kept up this pattern at the 1994 festival.
Having greatly invested in the UNIP administration in the last decade, and feeling
that they had been given a fair deal, the Nkoya were certainly not in the forefront
of Mr Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), when
this materialised in 1990 out of the political contest against the failing Kaunda
administration. Even though Mr Kalaluka had lost his parliamentary seat, and
hence his ministerial post, in the 1987 élections to a non-Nkoya contender from
Kaoma district, the links to the political centre had become sufficiently open, and
the sense of political compétence sufficiently developed, to take a maturely demo-
cratie stance. Recalling the lack of democratie knowledge and attitudes which I
found in the area in 1973, I am now amazed by the ease with which ordinary
villagers, men and women, talk about the national political issues of today, and
define their own position within what is essentially a democratie constitutional
framework. I grant that a considérable part of the credit must go to the inspiration
of the democratie movement which swept over Zambia since the late 1980s; but
this would have fallen on completely infertile ground, had not a graduai process
of Nkoya/state accommodation over the 1970s and 1980s, under UNIP, already
turned the people into democrats with a realistic national outlook. One recognised
the unmistakable need for change, and was prepared to give majority support even
to parliamentary candidates (such as Mr Mandande and Mr Tumbila, the present
MMD MPs for the district) who were new men both at the national and the
regional level, and of whom the former did not even qualify nor identify as
Nkoya. Realising that the Nkoya group had come to carry a certain weight at the
national and regional level, the political and symbolic brokers that make up the
Kazanga association's executive lost no time in trading Nkoya support for organ-
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isational and logistic facilities under the new government. Needless to say, the
promise of innovation and restoration which constitute MMD's main appeal tied
in very well with the local reconstruction the Nkoya were already involved in on
their own impetus. Again, the crucial inspiration appears to have been local and
ethnie rather than national and democratie — but now at least within a framework
of open and viable local/national relations.
However, the Nkoya have learned not to put all their eggs in one basket. Only a
few months before the élections of October 1991 (cf. Sichone 1991-92; Baylies
and Szeftel 1992) which brought Mr Chiluba's victory and Mr Kaunda's political
démise, the latter had personally intervened in an attempt by the Litunga19 to
downgrade or even abolish the kingships of Kahare and Mutondo. Perhaps some-
what alarmed by the prominence, in MMD, of Lozi politicians such as Mr Arthur
Wina and Mr Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika (both of whom have since left
MMD, however), established Nkoya Community leaders, both in modern and
traditional office, tended to continue siding with UNIP. Even after Mr Chiluba's
installation as President of Zambia, massive UNIP rallies have continued to be
held in Kaoma district, with Nkoya party officials in prominent positions. Of
course, mis is to be expected under a multi-party democracy, and it is regrettable
that, barely one and a half years after the change-over (April 1993), the first UNIP
activists had to be made political prisoners in MMD Zambia. Most recently, the
National Party's success in Western Province as a whole, at the expense of MMD,
is also reflected in Kaoma district, and without destructive friction the national
and regional executive of the Kazanga association continues to encompass the
various party-political options such as exist at the national level. Local ethnie
reconstruction continues to take precedence over national party allegiance.
The nature of my data does not allow me to make pronouncements about MMD
and thé récent démocratisation process in général at the national level (cf.
Mudenda 1992). My story about one ethnie group in one rural district should not
be misread to imply an interprétative pattern for Zambia as a whole, or for rural
Zambia as a whole. Having not started thé post-colonial period with a gréât deal
of knowledge or illusions about thé démocratie constitutional process and of their
own rôle therein, having fared much better under UNIP than could be expected,
and tapping a source of revitalisation at thé local ethnie rather than thé national
démocratie level, thé Nkoya could scarcely muster thé gréât sensé of frustration
and anger that characterised thé seasoned trade unionists, politicians and intellec-
tuals at MMD's centre (cf. Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chattel 1990; Kamwambe
1991).
The Nkoya story is only a footnote to thé spécifie recent history of the MMD in
Zambia. But it suggests that MMD in itself cannot be understood unless against
the background of thé total, and uneven, picture of the émergence of a global
democratie political culture in Zambia, a process in which traditional leadership,
religious alternatives, and local/national relations constitute important dimen-
sions.
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Glimpses of Democracy in Francistown, Botswana
From this point in my argument, and from Zambia, it is only a short step to
Botswana, a neighbouring country which appears to have remained untouched by
the African démocratisation movement of recent years. If the Nkoya case in
Zambia brings out regional poütics, ethnie reconstruction and the partial survival
of a local, ancient political culture as limiting conditions to the reception of the
North Atlantic democratie model, the Botswana case would suggest that further
boundary conditions lie in the quality of the state's economie performance, and in
the ideological construction of a sense of historie continuity in the local political
culture, so that the state elite can pose as emulating, rather than providing an
alternative to, political traditions as perceived by the state's ordinary citizens.
Botswana is a most interesting case among African countries, since to the outside
world it has presented the image of one of the very few African democracies that
has survived intact since independence; moreover it is one of the few African
économies that has avoided the stagnation so common in the continent during the
1970-198ÛS. So the most obvious answer to the question as to why there is no
conspicuous démocratisation movement in Botswana, would seem to be: 'because
no further démocratisation is needed — the country is a viable democracy and the
state delivers what the citizens expect'.
My research, since 1988, in Botswana's second largest town, Francistown has,
however, convinced me that this answer is only partially correct. The Botswana
state does deliver, albeit far from lavishly, and in ways which (as the Batswana20
workers often complain) compares poorly with the income situation and standard
of living in neighbouring South Africa, with which many Batswana are familiär
from labour migration, personal contacts and the media. At the same time, Bot-
swana is far from a totally convincing democracy.21
The political scène is dominated by the ruling Botswana Democratie Party (BDP).
Of the handful of other parties, only the Botswana National Front (BNF) and
Botswana People's Party (BPP) are sufficienüy organised to win a few parliamen-
tary seats in the général élections, which are held regularly at five-year intervals,
the last in 1989. The weakness of the opposition is not due to lack of politicians of
great capabilities, but to lack of funds (whereas the ruling party is at least logisti-
cally facilitated by the government), fragmentation, a low degree of grassroots
organisation, and the circumstance that the ruling party's powers of co-optation
and appeal for peace and unity eut across political boundaries. Among the tactics
which the ruling party uses in order to perpetuate ils position of dominance, are
the appointment of additional members of elected political bodies whenever the
opposition threatens to take a majority, and persuading opposition members to
cross the floor to the ruling party (a case in point is the Francistown Town
Council in 1987). Another strategy is that of postponing the implementation of
unpopulär décisions such as the démolition of a squatter area until after élections,
especially if thé area in question has a high proportion of BDP supporters.22 A
related and even more général strategy is securing public support in exchange for
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such facilities as the state (controlled by the ruling party) has to offer: junior
secondary schools, clinics, boreholes. Comparable is the government's handling
of many millions of Pulas23 of arrears incurred in the country's ambitious and
praiseworthy Self-Help Housing Association (SHHA) programme: on the basis of
repayable loans and monthly service levies, this programme provided adequate,
occupant-owned housing for tens of thousands of town dwellers, but until well
after the 1989 général élections the BDP administration chose not to take legal
action concerning the arrears for fear of estrangeing the vast majority of benefici-
aries that had often run into very considérable arrears.
The electronic media in Botswana are government-controlled and so is the only
daily newspaper, although there are a number of private weekly periodicals which
maintain considérable independence from the ruling party. The Botswana consti-
tution (Republic of Botswana 1983) guarantees the usual human rights, and its
extensive limiting clauses in the interest of peace and order are fairly standard by
comparison to other constitutions. In practice these clauses mean, for example,
that people are not allowed to use any language other man English and Tswana in
court and parliament (although about 30 per cent have other languages as their
mother-tongue), and that hardly any periodicals or books in these languages are
published, partly because people are under the impression that this would be
illegal. The use of private printing presses is subject to a licence which every
printer is at pains not to forfeit.
'Freedom squares', which are open spaces set aside for public meetings of a
political nature, exist in every residential area and village and are open to what-
ever political party applies for a permit to use them, but all political meetings
taking place there are attended by uniformed police who tape the proceedings.
There are no political prisoners in Botswana, but individuals who during ques-
tioning time at such meetings bring up awkward issues have occasionally been
known to be taken for questioning. Similarly, opposition politicians and ethnie
activists have opted for careers of self-employment in the awareness that they
would be likely to be penalised by thwarted promotion opportunities, if not actual
dfsmissal, if they pursued their activities from positions as civil servants, teachers,
etc. In places like Francistown where a garrison is stationed, and especially in
border areas, people have learned to fear the soldiers, whose conduct is not
always subject to the kind of control one would expect under the rule of law.
With the rapid post-independence quantitative expansion of éducation, and the
existence of oppositional politics since the 1960s, constitutional knowledge is
Considérable in educated and middle-class circles. However, among the genera!
public the level of democratie awareness and actual political participation, includ-
irig voting, are low. Certainly in Francistown the majority of the population would
give the impression of taking the government for granted, even in the de facto
one-party form it has assumed in Botswana, without taking great interest and,
especially, without being keen on change.
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Hère I refer to thé distinction I made earlier between national-level political
participation and immédiate democracy at the grassroots level of village, urban
residential area, workplace, school, etc.. Batswana, both in town and in villages,
do take a keen interest in their immédiate social environment, and actively seek to
structure it through organisation and participation. The social environment need
not coincide with thé direct physical environment, and often extends far beyond.
In newly-settled residential areas many people find it difficult to establish flour-
ishing dyadic, informai ties with thé strangers that happen to hâve become their
neighbours, but they actively maintain ties with people from their home village,
their ethnie group, their church and their workplace (Van Binsbergen 1991,
1993a). And whenever dyadic relations can be embedded in a lasting collective
organisational setting involving a number of people on a more or less permanent,
formai and predictable basis, Batswana show gréât eagerness and creativity in thé
pursuit of public responsibility. Voluntary associations (especially independent
churches and sport associations) are a dominant feature of social life, not only in
towns but also in rural areas. The model of serious and candid consultation
between equals informs thé pattern of interaction at the village assembly (kgotla},
where basic values of sociability, respect, and inclusiveness are brought out in a
way which makes proceedings take on a social significance far exceeding that of
thé adjudication of petty individual cases. So much is the kgotla model the
standard for idéal social behaviour, that it is immediately emulated whenever thé
diffusion of information, thé need to arrive at a décision, or thé settlement of a
conflict nécessitâtes thé appeal to a common framework of interest and a shared
model of action: in family matters, on thé work-floor, in formai organisations, etc.
In thèse contexts thé everyday rhythm of activities including thé bureaucratie
division of labour and group boundaries are time and again punctuated by infor-
mai, impromptu but extremely effective ceremonies of consultation which are thé
hallmark of Botswana political culture. For Batswana, thé test of appropriate
public behaviour, decision-making and 'democracy' lies in principle in this type
of practical consultation, far more than in the remote letter of any modem or
traditional constitutional législation.
As such, the kgotla model, as pivotai in thé national culture, provides a welcome
instrument in the hands of the Botswana state elite seeking to legitimate and
perpetuate ils position of power. Emphatic public référence to, and artificial
émulation of, thé kgotla model can produce, in thé mind of common Batswana, a
sensé of historie continuity and légitimation where in fact there is discontinuity,
transformation and unchecked élite appropriation of societal power. The skilful
manipulation of thé kgotla model in Botswana thus produces what we might
designate, somewhat floridly, as 'populist authoritarianism through symbolic en-
gineering'. Today, proceedings at village dikgotla and especially at Urban
Customary Courts are claimed to be in accordance with thé time-honoured kgotla
model which — as thé élite never tires of reminding thé population — is at the
heart of thé Botswana tradition; but in fact uniformed police officiais and clerks
have appropriated the judicial process even at thé village level, and even more so
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in town, where no cross-examination by ordinary members of the public is al-
lowed, the slim volume of the Pénal Code is applied rigidly and mechanically
without référence to customary law even in the latter's codified form, and where
sessions are even closed to the public. By the same token, the open-air Freedom
Squares and the political meetings which the ruling party and its weak rivais
organise there emulate the kgotla pattern, so much so that people may take their
own traditional kgotla stools there for seats, or use make-shift seats of rocks; but
we have seen how the actual proceedings during these meetings greatly deviate
from the spirit of the kgotla pattern. More examples could be cited, for example,
the sphère of traditional leadership (where the chiefs — dikgosi, of old the central
figures at dikgotla — have been turned into salaried petty officials), or the state's
authoritarian management (through the Registrar of Societies) of people's self-or-
ganisation in voluntary associations (Van Binsbergen 1993b). In these fields, and
many more, the same elite-engineered suggestion of cultural continuity in combi-
nation with authoritarian state control along the lines of a non-traditional bureau-
cratie logic can be pin-pointed.
In the Zambian Nkoya case traditional rulers, the Myene, appeared as original foei
of a local political culture which, while allowing for certain forms of sociological
democracy (C), could not and would not be reduced to the globalizing idiom of
constitutional democracy along North Atlantic lines (B), — so that the trajectory
of démocratisation in that context revolved on the process of interplay between a
local and a global political model, each accommodating to, and reinforcing ramer
than annihilating the other. In the Botswana case the situation is very different
(Gillett 1973; Roberts 1972; Silitshena 1979). The kgotla pattern does imply the
rôle of the traditional ruler, whose co-ordinating présence structures the kgotla
proceedings, leads them to a conclusion, and légitimâtes them with the mystical
sanctions of nis office. Under indirect rule, dikgosi did continue to be the principal
conspicuous political authorities in Bechuanaland throughout the colonial period,
and since independence (1966) the post-colonial state has derived much of its
authority in the eyes of its citizens from the skill with which it has encapsulated
the dikgosi. In many ways it would be true to say that the central state is feit by its
subjects to be the legitimate heir to the dikgosi. Besides, the BDP was founded by
Sir Seretse Khama, heir apparent to a major royal title (that of the Ngwato), and
son of the internationally famous kgosi Khama III. In other words, in the Bot-
swana case we do not find a dynamic juxtaposition between local tradition and
globalizing modem state structure, but thé sélective subjugation, appropriation
and manipulation of local tradition by the state elite.
Some impression of political attitudes and behaviour can be gleaned from thé
following selected results of a questionnaire survey I conducted in Francistown in
1989.24 The relevant questions as presented hère were embedded in a far more
extensive questionnaire dealing with household composition, social contacts, éco-
nomie activities, health behaviour, sexuality, média consumption and church life.
This resulted in highly personal and relaxed in-depth interviews each extending
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over several hours, taking every possible care that the questions were clear and
neutral, and building in cross-checks.
(a) Did you register as a voter? Yes (73%); No (27%). More than one quarter of the respondents
claim not to have re gistered as a voter, although les s than one tenth did not qualifyfor reasons of
age and citizenship.
(b) Which party do you support? None (10%); BDP (43%); BPP (27%); BNF (20 %). Barely two
fiflhs of the respondents claim to support the ruling party BDP, although in the 1989 élections the
BDP carried as many as seven of the 11 Francistown war ds25
(c) What do you think about the following statements?
1. 'In a democratie country like Botswana, every citizen is free to form a new politica! party and
totry and get the majority vote.' Agrée (76%); Don'tknow(ll%); Disagree(13%). As many as
one quarter of the respondents turn out not to know their basic poütical rights.
2. 'Botswana would be better off if the chiefs get the powers back they had before inde-
pendence.' Agrée (36%); Don't know (22%); Disagree (42%). Only one third of the respondents
claim to be dissatisfied with chiefs' position in post -independent Botswana, whereas many more
approve of the current situation in which the state has effectively appropriated chiefs' powers.
3. 'It is sinful to criticise the government of Botswana'. Agrée (35%); Don't know (21%);
Disagree (44%). More than one third of the respondents hold the view that it is moral ly wrong to
criticise the government.
4. 'It is all right to break the laws of the government as long as you are not found out'. Agrée
(18%); Don't know (9%); Disagree (73%). Three quarters of the respondents give évidence of
hoving fully internalis ed the state's authority.
5. 'The government of Botswana makes sure that nobody needs to go without food, clothing,
shelter, éducation and médical services.' Agrée (49%); Don't know (12%); Disagree (39%).
Nearly half of the respondents claim that the Botswana state takes excellent care ofits citizens,
although almost two-fifih are of the adverse opinion.
6. 'The people who talk about apartheid and oppose the political system of South Africa, are just
trouble-makers.' Agrée (37%); Don't know (12%); Disagree (51%). More than one third of the
{Black) respondents reject the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, most probably — cf.
statement (3)—because political contestation is abhorred no matter howjustified the cause.
1. 'Our traditional culture is just a thing of the past — it must disappear and be replaced by the
international culture which we see on TV, in the magazines, and from the expatriâtes.' Agrée
(21%); Don't know (13%); Disagree (66%). Two thirds of the respondents claim to insist on
cultural continuity between the past and the future.
(d) Do you know your ward councillor personally? Yes (55%); No (45%). More than half of the
respondents claim to know their ward councillor personally. (This official acts as a référence when
applying for the application of a self-help housing plot, but is hardly involved in informal conflict
régulation between résidents at the ward level).
What these responses suggest (but of course far more data and analysis are needed
in order to substantiate this point) is that — at least at one level of formal and
normative consciousness, such as is elicited in formal survey interviews — the
average urban Motswana view even the post-colonial state not as a structure of
democratie negotiation which is ultimately empowered and controlled by himself
or herself, but as a sacrosanct outside entity, which nurtures and protects but
should not be challenged, and which is essentially in continuity with the colonial
and pre-colonial past.
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This conception of the state as beyond civil control and criticism was even
projected onto neighbouring South Africa, at a time when Mr Mandela was still
imprisoned, and nothing hinted at the democratie developments which were to
take place after 1990. The migratory exposure to South Africa has had a tremen-
dous impact upon life in Botswana in the course of the 20th Century, and it
certainly had a political effect. The first political parties were founded in Francis-
town by returning migrants deeply involved in the South African ANC (Murray et
al 1987; Nengwekhulu 1979); the Kalanga-oriented BPP retains that influence,
but, at least in terms of élection results, has lost out locally to the populist
Tswana-oriented BDP, which claims continuity (through Tswana, the national
language), with the Botswana traditional culture. The conséquence is the dissimu-
lation of social contradictions in the guise of an ideology of peace and progress.
From a democratie perspective, church independence, with the political acquies-
cence and aloofness it has implied for ordinary churchgoers throughout Southern
Africa, has proved a more signigicant, although negative, South African export.
In such a setting, there is not much incentive for a drive for more democracy at the
national level, given the skilfully-manipulated traditional kgotla model, illusory as
it might be.
In the final analysis, it may not be the alleged continuity with the past (through
language, the kgotla model, the encapsulation of traditional authorities, etc.) and
with notions pertaining to the handling of power in face-to-face settings, which
explains the majority's lack of interest in greater démocratisation in Botswana at
the national level, but rather the internai contradictions within the package of
globalisation that has come to control Botswana today. And this is true of Bot-
swana more man any other African country of my acquaintance with the excep-
tion of South Africa. As one would expect in a country like Botswana, it is not
democratie political participation but mass consumption along incipient class
lines which represents the part of the global culture which has the greatest mass
appeal. Probably this sélection partly reflects a concern with wealth, its circula-
tion and accumulation, which was built into the pastoral economy and the patril-
ineal kinship System long before the advent of colonialism and capitalism; many
centuries ago, the great Zimbabwe and Torwa state Systems that once encom-
passed part of Botswana, already thrived on the circulation of wealth (Tlou and
Campbell 1984). When consumption within a cash economy has become a basic
Standard of self-esteem and social prestige, as is very clearly the case in urban
Botswana today, one would hardly expect to encounter democratie initiative and
courage to a level higher than that found in the North Atlantic région where the
dampening effect of affluence on radical political attitudes has been the subject of
a considérable literature.
The Batswana's fundamental satisfaction with the matenal performance of the
post-independence state must be an important, perhaps even crucial factor in
explaining their lack of opposition and the absence, in recent years, of a demo-
cratie movement. The dynamics of the prevailing political culture would appear to
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be a very significant additional factor, for it engenders political acquiescence and
dissipâtes foci of contention with civil society, producing thé suggestion of cul-
tural continuity between actual state performance and populär notions of legiti-
mate power hingeing on the kgotla model, which in fact is only a manipulated
neo-traditional façade for an authoritarian elite state based upon participation.
Conclusion
I hâve stressed that thé global model of democracy is a very spécifie, and far from
universal, form of political culture, which needs to be learned before it can be
expected to be applied, and which opérâtes in the context of alternative, more
indigenous views of participation, légitimation and constitutional procédure. In
order to appreciate thé substantial local variations within this process, national-
level analyses can be fruitfully complemented with anthropological insights into
thé way people structure their local political life-worlds and interpret globalizing
national politics within a particularist local framework of expectations and con-
cerns. The démocratisation movement in Africa since the late 1980s is often
portrayed as the return to a model of national democracy that allegedly was
already there at national independence but that had merely been eroded or become
dormant in subséquent years. My argument, selectively based on ethnographie
évidence from thé grassroots level in two very différent contemporary situations
in Southern Africa, suggests, however, that thé démocratisation movement is only
another phase in thé ongoing political transformation of Africa, in thé course of
which, by an interplay between local and national (ultimately global) conceptions
of political power, indigenous constitutional, philosophical and sociological alter-
natives for political legitimacy are tested, accommodated or discarded as obsolète.
The capricious and contradictory outcomes of this process at the local level need
to be taken into account, particularly by those who hope that the modem démo-
cratie model can yet transcend its North Atlantic origins and become thé corner-
stone of a new and better world.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was présentée at the seminar on Démocratisation in Africa,
African Studies Centre, Leiden, 24 September, 1993. I am indebted to the organisers, my
colleagues Robert Buijtenhuijs and Elly Rijnierse, for creating a stimulating environment for
the production of mis paper, and to the present journal's anonymous reader for stimulating
comments.
2. For an incisive, up-to-date summary of that discussion, cf. Buijtenhuijs and Rijnierse 1993.
3. Cf. Colas 1992; Hannerz 1987; Featherstone 1990; Van Binsbergen 1994; and références
cited there.
4. In this respect, adopting a detached, culturally relative view of the North Atlantic concept of
democracy falls under the tantalising category of tabooed ideas in international social sci-
ence, to which my teacher Köbben (1975; 1991) has devoted illuminating discussions.
5. Khumiri village society, highlands of north-western Tunisia, 1968, 1970; Nkoya rural society,
Kaoma district, Zambia, and its urban extensions along the Zambian line of rail, 1972 to present;
Manjak rural society, north-westem Guinea-Bissau, 1983; Francistown urban society, Botswana,
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and its urban-rural ties ramifying into surrounding Kalanga, Tswana and Ndebele villages,
198 8 to present.
6. Glover 1927; Forrest 1966; remarkably, Plato and Aristotle (e.g. Bierens de Haan 1943)
criticised the demokratia of their time, not for being insufficiently democratie but for being
over-democratic, for having become odokrateia, or mob rule.
7. De Tocqueville 1954; Mannheim 1940; Doornbos et al 1984 and références cited there.
8. The following summary of Dutch constitutional history illustrâtes this point: "Before 1848
the franchise in the Netherlands was very limited indeed. Even after 1848, at first the vast
majority of the population were deprived of the franchise. Until die Constitutional Reforms
of 1887, the right to vote depended on the amount one had to pay for taxes (the so-called
census franchise). The Constitution of 1887 made provision for the extension of the franchise
to certain, not clearly defined, catégories of persons, by introducing the criterion of 'attributes
of appropriate status and wealth', which attributes were further elaborated in the Franchise
BUI of 1896. At that stage catégories of voters included 'tax voters', 'dwelling voters', 'salary
voters', 'savings voters' and 'examination voters'. Under this System in 1916 only 70 per
cent of Dutch males had the right to vote. The Constitutional Reforms of 1917 introduced the
genera! franchise for males, and in principle made provision for women's franchise. In 1922
women's franchise was enacted in the constitution. ... Invariably, the passive franchise
accrued to all Dutch males who possessed the active franchise. Until 1917 women were
explicitly excluded also from the passive franchise" (Winkler Prins 1974, my translation; cf.
Oud 1967; Van der Pot & Donner 1968).
9. Anthropological field-work among the Zambian Nkoya, alternating between the Kaoma
district and migrants in the national capital city of Lusaka, was undertaken in 1972-74, and
during shorter visits in 1977, 1978, 1981, 1988, 1989, 1992 (twice) and 1994 (twice).
Anthropological field-work in Francistown and surrounding rural areas was undertaken in
1988-89 and during shorter visits in 1990, 1991 and 1992 (twice) and 1994.1 am indebted to
the African Studies Centre, Leiden, for the most generous encouragement and financial
support since I joined the centre in 1977; and to research participants, to assistants and
government officials in both Zambia and Botswana and to members of my family, for
invaluable contributions to the research.
10. A case in point is African Watchtower throughout South Central Africa from the 1910s; cf.
also the Lumpa church of Alice Lenshina; Van Binsbergen 1981 and références cited there.
For Botswana the rise of church independence as a major form of contestation preceding by
several decades the formation of politica! parties (Lagerwerf 1982; Grant 1971; Chirenje
1977) is a case in point. For a général perspective on thèse points, cf. Gluckman 1971. For a
critique claiming that views such as mine or Gluckman's amount to underplaying thé contri-
bution of villagers to thé independence struggle, cf. Van Donge 1986.
11. A common assumption in thé literature on thé articulation of modes of production in Africa is
that young men went to work so that, via a monetarization of bride wealth, elders could
continue to exercise their kinship-based power in new forms; in fact however, it was often
inter-generational conflict at the village level (where youths hâve tended to regard ail elderly
men as sorcerers, and often wandered from one kin patron to another in a long chain of
disappointment and distress) which propelled youths into a career as labour migrants. The
comforts of thé old African cosmologies ought not to be exaggerated.
12. Outside Barotseland, two more Nkoya royal chiefs survived: Mwene Kabulwebulwe of
Central Province and Mwene Moomba of Southern Province.
13. Even after the state's création of Local Courts (which were nominally independent from the
Mwene) in 1965.
14. The Mwene is thus one of thé Tears [or, less anthropomorpically, Drops] of Rain which
feature in thé title of my main book on thé Nkoya (Van Binsbergen 1992).
15. Which is largely an exalted version of the enthronement ceremony of village headmen, and
even of the ordinary name inheritance ceremony by which a surviving junior kinsmen takes a
deceased's name.
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16. I cannot go into the peculiar gender dynamics of high political office among the Nkoya. Clan
heads and early kings tended to be women, but there have been no female Myene since the
middle of the 19th Century. Cf. Van Binsbergen, 1986,1992a.
17. At the time political parties and the church provided virtually the only organisational struc-
ture for the rapidly growing squatter areas where Nkoya urban migrants used to live.
18. A fifth Nkoya royal chieftainship has now been revived: in October 1994, Mwene Pumpola
of Dongwe/Lukulu will be ceremonially installed before délégations of all other royal courts
and with a substantial participation of the Kazanga association executive and its cérémonial
dancing troupe.
19. Who had meanwhile been restored to government esteem, and was even made Member of the
Central Committee, i.e. UNEP's highest représentative in the province, and a member of
parliament. Under the Chiluba administration, meanwhile, state-Litunga relations are steadily
declining again, while the Lozi aristocracy tends to retreat in delusions of territorial séces-
sion.
20. In line with national usage, Batswana is taken here in the sense of 'Botswana nationals',
rather than that of 'people identifying as members of the Tswana cluster of ethnie groups'.
21. Cf. Holm & Molutsi 1989; Picard 1987; Molomio & Mokopakgosi 1991; Chariten 1993;
Bernard 1989; Crowder 1988; Good 1992.
22. As happened with thé Francistown PWD squatter area situated in thé Government Camp
ward no. 58; Van Binsbergen and Krijnen 1989; Krijnen 1991.
23. Pl= US$0.45.
24. The results are based on a statistically représentative sample survey of 175 adults (18 years of
âge and older) of both sexes, résident in Francistown in 1989; of thèse, seven per cent were
under thé légal voting âge of 21 years. Of thé 175 respondents, 98 per cent claimed to be
Botswana citizens, and 87 per cent claimed to be in thé possession of a national registration
card ('O Mang').
25. 'Government Notice No. 326 of 1989, L2/7/98 XX ', in: Republic of Botswana, Government
Gazette, 27, 59, 27th October, 1989, pp. 1398-1402 — thé Francistown returns being listed
on p. 1399. Thèse data have been corrected in thé light of 'Government Notice No. 354 of
1989, L2/7/126/H', in Republic of Botswana, Government Gazette, 27, 63, 17th November,
1989, p. 1504, according to which ward 67 was carried not by BPP but by BDP.
26. This was more man half a year before Mr Mandela's release from prison, when nobody could
foresee thé imminent dismantling of thé apartheid state. However, the response was more
positive to a related but differently phrased question: "The political System of South Africa is
wrong and must be changed". Agrée (79 per cent); Don't know (12 per cent); Disagreee (9
per cent).
27. Cf. Schoffeleers 1991; church leaders and church committees présent a rather more opposi-
tional picture, cf. Van Binsbergen 1993b.
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